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NOTE
INFANTs-LABILITY OF INFANT UNDER RESPONDEAT Su-
PERIOR.-The growing use and ownership of automobiles, and the
more common exercise of control over agents and servants by
infants of high school age, has made more acute the problem of the
infant's liability for his agent's torts under the doctrine of respon-
deat superior. Should an infant be permitted to own a tar or a
store building and yet be free from liability for the acts of his
agents and servants ?2
In a recent Illinois case, Johnson v. Turner,3 an infant owner of
a truck directed his employee to drive it. The driver committed a
tort and it was held that the infant was not liable. The court said
that an infant cannot be held for the tort of another under the
doctrine of respondeat superior. A few months earlier a federal
lAgency is the generdl, inclusive term covering the principal-agent and
master-servant relation. The master-servant relation is the more specific,
exclusive term denoting a control over the servant's physical conduct. Re-
spondent superior is founded on this relation. See, Restatement, Agency,
(1933) Sec. 1 and Sec. 2.2Covault v. Nevitt, (1914) 157 Wis. 113, 146 N. W. 1115, S1 L. IL A.
(N. S.) 1092, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 959 (infant owned a store building) ; Wil-
cox v. Wunderlich, (1928) 73 Utah 1, 272 P. 207 (two infants jointly
owned a car).3
"The rule is that as a minor cannot make a contract, he cannot estab-
lish the relationship of master-servant or principal-agent, and so cannot be
held liable for the tort of another under the doctrine of respondent superior."
Johnson v. Turner, (1943) 319 Ill. App. 265, 49 N. E. (2d) 297, 306.
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district court in Virginia in the case of Carroll v. Harrison, 4 was
confronted with the same problem. The infant had allowed another
to drive his truck. The driver committed a tort. It was held that
the infant was liable. The court said that where an infant does
through his agent something which he has full legal capacity to do
himself, he may be held liable for the torts of that agent within the
scope of his authority It is the purpose of this note to analyze
these two rules and to determine which is more logical and which
more socially desirable.
Of the cases in point, ' the majority are in accord with Johnson
v. Turner and hold the infant not liable for the torts of his agent
or servant on the basis of respondeat superior. The American Law
Institute refuses to take any stand on the question.0
The reasoning of the majority is as follows . (a) The doctrine
of respondeat superior rests upon the relationship of master-
servant or principal-agent which relationship is based upon con-
tract ;7 (b) Since the infant is not bound by his contract, except
for necessities,8 an infant cannot legally appoint an agent or
servant because this agency relation has its foundation in con-
tracts and so the agency is void;9 and (c) Therefore, the infant
is not liable for his agents' tortious acts done in prosecution of the
agency relation.'
This reasoning is fallacious, first, because the second premise
is incorrect. Although the earlier cases took the view that the
agency relation is purely contractual," the courts today recognize
4Carroll v. Harrison, (1943) 49 F Supp. 283.
5Burns v. Smith, (1902) 29 Ind. App. 181, 64 N. E. 94, 94 Am. St.
Rep. 268, Wilcox v. Wunderlich, (1928) 73 Utah 1, 272 P 207, Covault
v. Nevitt, (1914) 157 Wis. 113, 146 N. W 1115, 51 L. R. A., (N. S.) 1092,
Ann. Cas. 1916A, 959; Hodge v. Feiner, (1935) 338 Mo. 268, 90 S. W (2d)
90, 103 A. L. R. 483, note p. 487 and cases cited therein, Palmer v. Miller,
(1942) 380 Ill. 256, 43 N. E. (2d) 974.
6American Law Institute, Restatement, Agency, (1933) Sec. 20 com-
ment (d)7Burnham v. Seaverns, (1869) 101 Mass. 360, 100 Am. Dec. 123. "The
doctrine of respondeat superior rests upon a contractual relation. It is
evident that to support the application of such principle it is necessary that
there be not only a valid contract of employment, but that the acts of
negligence complained of were committed while the servant was engaged
in the scope of his employment under the contract." Palmer v. Miller, (1942)
380 Il1. 256, 259, 43 N. E. (2d) 973.
81 Williston, Contracts, (1936) Sec. 226.9Covault v. Nevitt, (1914) 157 Wis. 113, 146 N. W 1115, 51 L. R. A.(N. S.) 1092, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 959.
'
0Hodge v. Feiner, (1935) 338 Mo. 266, 90 S. W (2d) 90,103 A. L. R.
483, notes p. 487
"Trueblood v. Trueblood, (1856) 8 Ind. 195, 65 Am. Dec. 750, 31
A. L. R. 1001, and note collecting the cases.
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that the agency relation, although it may arise from contract, is
not necessarily contractual, and it was not contractual in its early
stages.12 Agency is a consensual relation imposing vicarious lia-
bility "3 This view is adopted by the American Law Institute and
the more recent cases.14 Courts have even found an agency relation
to exist where there clearly was no contract.
Secondly, the first premise is also fallacious because tort
liability is imposed under the doctrine of respondeat superior with-
out regard to contract.1 6 The tort liability of a master or principal
is vicarious.'7 It extends even to the servant's unauthorized acts
if these are within the scope of his employment." It is the existence
of the master-servant relation and the master's right of control at
the time that the servant acts on which liability depends. It is not
12Holmes, Agency, (1891) 4 Harv. L. R. 345.
13Seavey, Rationale of Agency, (1920) 29 Yale L. J. 859, 863. "That
the relationship (agency) is consensual there can be no doubt" I Williston,
Contracts, (1936) Sec. 274.
*4 . while not nqcessarily contractual, the relation of agency is
always consensual, it is vicarious in its nature . " Lohmuller Bldg. Co. v.
Gamble, (1931) 160 lid. 534, 154 Atl. 41, 43. Accord. Brothers v. Berg(1934) 214 Wis. 661, 254 N. W 384, Lee v. Peoples' Coop., (1937) 201
Minn. 266, 276 N. W 214, Columbia Umv. Club v. Heggins, (1938) 23
F Supp. 572; 1 Restatement, Agency, (1933) sec. 20 (b) "Agency is not
necessarily the reiult of a contract; hence it is not necessary for the appoint-
ment of an agent that the principal should have capacity to contract. Agency
is, however, a consensual Telationship, and therefore the principal must
have capacity to give a legally operative consent"
iiQuaere, wherein do the courts find even consent in these cases?
(a) Bergh v. Warner, (1891) 47 Minn. 250, 50 N. IV 77 (Wife, as
"agent," binds husband when she buys necessities), Hanscom v.
Mpls. St. Ry. Co., (1893) 53 Minn. 119, 54 N. W 944, 20 L. R. A.
695, Arkansas Steam R. R. v. Loughridge, (1898) 65 Ark. 300, 45
S. XV 907 (Emergency hiring of physician to attend injured).
(b) Family car doctrine: Kayser v. VanNest, (1941) 125 Minn. 277,
146 N. W 1091, Lewis v. Steele, (1916) 52 Mont. 300, 157 P 575.
(c) Gratuitous agency cases: Berch v. Abercrombie, (1913) 74 Wash.
486, 133 P 1020, 50 L. RK A. (N.S.) 59; Kurtz v. Farrington,(1926) 104 Conn. 257, 132 At. 540, 48 A. L. R. 259; Gorton v.
Doty, (1937) 57 Idaho 792, 69 P (2d) 136, 140. "It is not essential
to the existence of authority that there be a contract between the
principal and agent or that the agent promise to act as such, nor
is it essential to the relationship of principal and agent that they,
or either, receive compensation." Accord. 1 Restatement, Agency,(1933) sec. 16.
16Lohmuller Bldg. Co. v. Gamble, (1931) 160 Md. 534, 154 Ad. 41, 43;
Lee v. Peoples' Coop., (1937) 201 Minn. 266, 276 N. W 214, 1 Restatenent,
Agency, (1933) sec. 16. 2 Mechem; Agency, (2d ed. 1914) see. 1859, p. 1440.
'
7 See Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, (1916) 26 Yale L. J. 105.
"sCrandall v. Boutell, (1905) 95 Minn. 114, 103 N. W 890; P F Collier
Co. v. Hartfiel, (C.C.A. Minn. 1934) 72 Fed. (2d) 625, Hammond v.
Eckerd's of Asheville, (1942) 220 N. C. 596, 18 S. E. (2d) 151, 1 Restate-
ment, Agency, (1933) sec. 216.
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control in fact, but the right of control,19 by the principal that is
significant.
The doctrine of respondeat superior is grounded in public
policy 20 The risk is placed upon the one best financially able to
bear it or to absorb the loss, the master or principal, not upon
the financially irresponsible servant. The business reaps the benefits
of the acts, so it must bear the liability The adult master is always
held liable under respondeat superior if the master-servant relation
is shown to exist.21 Why should not the infant-master be held
financially responsible? Professor Seavey,22 the reporter for the
Restatement of Agency, prefers to impose liability upon the infant
for his servant's derelictions. He states that the result should not
be based upon the capacity of an infant tb appoint an agent or
servant, as the majority rule holds, but upon whether or not it is
socially desirable to free an infant-master or employer from tort
liability where the harm has been caused by the servant and it is
not the direct consequence of the infant's act. In short, he believes
that the policy underlying respondeat superior applies equally to
infant-employers or principals.
It is highly significant to note that courts (even courts who
free the infant from liability where he is not present) do not
hesitate to hold the infant liable where the agent is in the imme-
diate presence of and subject to the direction and control of the
infant while doing the tortious act.23 Here the courts think wholly
19Restatement, Agency, (1933) sec. 220 (1) "A servant is a person em-
ployed to perform service for another in his affairs and who, with respect
to his physical conduct in his performance of the service, is subject to
the other's control or right of control" (italics are ours). Cushman Motor
Co. v. Bernick, (1936) 55 Ohio App. 31, 8 N. E, (2d) 446, 448, Skidmore
v. Haggard, (1937) 341 Mo. 837, 110 S. W (2d) 726,. 729, "A servant is a
person employed by the master to perform services in the latter's affairs
under control or subject to the right of control by the master." (Italics ours.)20Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, (1916) 26 Yale L. J. 105.
Laski stated that the basis of the rule, in fact, is public policy. He gives
three reasons for the imposition of vicarious liability upon the master. (a)
It provides social distribution of profit and loss. (b) By rendering the master
liable for his imprudence the law forces him to be a policeman. (c) Business
is a dangerous enterprise and so it must pay its own way.
211 Restatement, Agency, (1933) sec. 219 (1). 2 Mechem, Agency, (2d
ed. 1914) sec. 1858, p. 1439.22Seavey, Agency Since the Restatement, (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 503,
505. 23The infant is held liable where the agent is in the immediate presence
of the infant. All the following cases involve the situation where cars under
the control or right of control of the infant are driven by their "agents."
Atchison, T. & F Ry. Co. v. McNulty (8th C.C.A. 1922) 285 Fed. 97, cert.
den. 262 U. S. 746, 43 S. Ct. 521, 67 L. Ed. 1212, McKerali v. St. Louis &
S. F Ry. (Mo. App. 1923) 257 S. W 166; Wilson v. Moudy, (1939) 22
Tenn. App. 356, 123 S. W (2d) 828, Haynie v. Jones, (1942) 233 Mo. App.
948, 127 S. W (2d) 105.
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in terms of tort liability and do not confuse the concepts of con-
tract liability and capacity to appoint agents with vicarious tort
liability 24 Without this confusion the result is quite apparent. The
principal, even though an infant, is held liable because he is in con-
trol of the situation. Even the early courts held2 5 the infant liable
where it was a "pure-tort," i.e., a tort not connected with contract'
Even though the agent or servant is not within the immediate pres-
ence and direction of the infant when he commits the tortious act,
ought not the infant still be held liable vicariously as long as the
master-servant relation exists and the infant has the right of
control ?
The real issue, therefore, is whether the public policy which
allows an infant to avoid his contracts - also demands that the
courts refuse to recognize the master-servant relation for purpose
of respondeat superior where the master is an infant. In short, is
there any reason in logic or policy for freeing an infant from
liability for the delictual acts of his servant or agent under his
control? We have already seen that the public policy underlying
the -doctrine of respondeat superior demands that an adult-master
be held liable for hls servant's acts. Do not these reasons equally
demand imposing financial responsibility upon the infant who
has an agent or servant?2-
All courts agree that an infant is liable for the commission of
his own torts.28 When one legally capable of acting consents that
another shall act on hIs behalf and subject to his control, he is
deemed to have acted himself."' Since an infant can consent that
241t is interesting to note that the Missouri court holds the infant liable
-when he is present, Haynie v. Jones, (1942) 233 Mo. App. 948, 127 S. W
(2d) 105; yet frees him from liability when he is not, Hodge v. Feiner,
(1935) 338 Mo. 268, 90 S. W (2d) 90, 103 A. L. R. 483, notes p. 487
-25Hall v. Corcoran, (1871) 107 Mass. 251, 9 Am. Rep. 30. "If the tort
can be found to be an independent and distinct one, as to which liability can
be made out without relying on the existence of the contract, the action will
lie," p. 1087 Prosser, Torts, (1940)- sec. 108. Also see Wisconsin Loan v.
Goodnough, (1930) 201 Wis. 101, 107,_.228 N. XV 484.2 Ornginally infant's contracts were void because it was said an infant
was not prudent and needed protection so the law freed him from disad-
vantageous transactions. Today they are not void, but merely voidable. 1
Williston, Contracts, (1936) sec. 227A. But the public policy of protecting
infants is not the same policy which underlies respondeat superior. The policy
of respondeat superior is to hold the financially responsible master to account,
regardless of who that master may be.
2-Gregory, Infant's Liability for His Agent's Torts, (1931) 5 Wis.
L. R. 453, 475-485, (1936) 21 Corn. L. Q. 623, 624, Seavey, Agency Since
the Restatement. (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 503, 505.28Madden, Domestic Relations, (1931) sec. 225, p. 604, Cooley. Torts,
(4th ed. 1932) sec. 66, p. 194, Prosser, Torts, (1940) sec. 108, p. 1085.29 echem, Agency, (2d ed. 1914) sec. 129.
486 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
another shall act on his behalf, he, too, should be bound for such
other's tortious acts to the same extent as though he had acted
himself. Therefore, it is submitted upon logic and public policy
that the infant be liable for his agent's and servant's tortious acts. 0
The recent writers on the subject also adopt this reasoning.a1
3OScott v. Schisler, (1931) 107 N. J. L. 397, 399, 153 Atl. 395, Feagles
v. Sullivan, (1938) 32 Pa. D. & C. Rep. 47, 52, Carroll v. Harrison, (D.C.
Va. 1943) 49 F Supp. 283. There is strong dictum in Smith v. Kron, (1887)
96 N. C. 392, 397, 2 S. E. 533, that an infant is liable for his agent's torts
where the agency was not created by'contract.
There appears language in the cases of Masterson v. Leonard, (1921)
116 Wash. 551, 200 P 320, 322, Ahlstedt v. Smith, (1936) 30 Neb. 372, 264
N. W 889, 891, Washington & 0. D. Ry. v. Zell's Adm'x, (1916) 118 Va.
755, 88 S. E. 309, 312, each of which holds an infant liable for the driver's
negligence when he engages in a joint enterprise with the driver, that indi-
cates the courts' holdings are based on the finding that an agency relationship
existed between the infant and the tortfeasor, the agency having arisen from
their joint enterprise. The true basis for the courts' holdings, however, is
not very clear.3lGregory, Infant's Liability for His Agent's Torts, (1931) 5 Wis.
L. R. 453, (1936) 21 Corn. L. Q. 623, Seavey, Agency Since the Restate-
ment, (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 503.
